Those people who regularly read my articles will know that, although my educational background is that of a scientist, I frequently criticize science in respect of its inability to say anything useful about the nature of reality. Because science can only operate by virtue of a subject making observations on an object, it only has validity in the empirical realm (vyavahAra). Nevertheless, I do acknowledge that science can sometimes throw light upon the thorny topics that we frequently encounter in advaita.  An obvious example of this is the findings of Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner regarding free will, about which I have written several times. Accordingly, I was very interested to hear recently (on a BBC Horizon program about how we perceive color) that scientists have carried out experiments which demonstrate that language affects the way in which we see the world.

 I did not expect to see anything relating to advaita in the program but, when they described an experiment concerning the Himba tribe of northern Namibia, it quickly became clear that this was relevant to the vAchArambhaNa sutras from the Chandogya Upanishad (to which I have referred in my series on the Mandukya Upanishad for example - http://advaita-academy.org/talks/mANDUkya-upaniShad-Series-%28Part-4%29.ashx.)  

 Of course, we know that there is no such thing as color in reality. The wavelength of the light that is reflected off an object is dependent upon the electronic orbitals around atoms in the surface material of the object. And we relate this wavelength directly to colors of the spectrum. The eyes have receptors in the retina, which are sensitive to different wavelengths. But the actual sensation of color is something that the brain constructs when the signals arrive along the optic nerve.

 The point being made by the program was that the Himba tribe only have five words to describe the major color categories, whereas we have 11 (named in English as: red, green, blue, yellow, black, white, grey, pink, orange, purple and brown). For example, they use the same word for both blue and green. And, whereas we would differentiate dark blue, dark green, dark brown, dark purple, dark red and black, the Himba have the single word ‘zoozu’ to refer to them all. The implication of this is that they do not differentiate between some colors that we see as distinct. And, sure enough, if they are shown a page containing a number of green squares and one blue square, they have great difficulty in picking the odd one out.

 The reason why the Himba tribe have so few words seems fairly clear. They have no need! They never come into contact with pure, highly saturated colors in their environment. And they have no contact with 'civilization', with its brightly colored advertising etc. So one can imagine that they never encounter some of our category colors, or at least have no desire to make a fashion statement about them! But it seems that this fact is actually causing them to see the world differently. The language that they use is effectively 'creating' the world that they see.

 Although I have been perfectly happy with the concept, that it is by giving something a name that we effectively create separation where none exists, this is the first time I have encountered a specifically cited scientific example. (The relevant phrase in the Chandogya is ‘vAchArambhaNaM vikAro nAmadheyaM’ and it emphasizes that all objects have no substantive other than brahman. vAchArambhaNa is a Vedic form of vAgAlambhana, which means it depends upon mere words or on some merely verbal difference. vikAro nAmadheyaM means that the vikaraH, transformation, is nAmadheya, a name only.)

 And a little research on the Internet shows that this is not the only example. Here is a quote from Curtis Hardin, PhD, a social psychologist at Brooklyn College. He says, "The strongest finding is that with increasing linguistic competence, the correlation between memory and language scheme increased, while the correlation between memory and perceptual space decreased."  And here is a quote from Wikipedia under the subject heading ‘Linguistic Relativity’: “The principle of linguistic relativity holds that the structure of a language affects the ways in which its speakers are able to conceptualize their world, i.e. their world view. Popularly known as the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, or Whorfianism, the principle is generally understood as having two different versions: (i) the strong version that language determines thought and that linguistic categories limit and determine cognitive categories and (ii) the weak version that linguistic categories and usage influence thought and certain kinds of non-linguistic behavior.” And Wilhelm von Humboldt said in 1820: “The diversity of languages is not a diversity of signs and sounds but a diversity of views of the world.”

 Thus, for example, Roberson, Davidoff and Shapiro (2002) found that speakers of a language that does not distinguish basic shape categories (square, circle, and triangle) were unable to sort stimuli into these categories. And another interesting example is given by Lera Boroditsky, who is assistant professor of psychology, neuroscience, and symbolic systems at Stanford University. She refers to an Aboriginal tribe – the Kuuk Thaayorre (or should that be kUk thAyorre?) in northern Australia: ‘Instead of words like "right," "left," "forward," and "back," which, as commonly used in English, define space relative to an observer, the Kuuk Thaayorre, like many other Aboriginal groups, use cardinal-direction terms — north, south, east, and west — to define space.’ And this is the case in all conversations in which spatial terms are used, even down to something like ‘There's an ant on your southeast leg’! Needless to say, this intimate association with direction means that their ability to navigate is exceptional.

 It reminds me of ‘The Revolving Boy’ to which I referred in my book ‘How To Meet Yourself’: “Sometime in my teens, I read a very original Science Fiction book called ‘The Revolving Boy’ by Gertrude Friedburg. It was about a child supposedly born on a spacecraft traveling between planets in zero gravity. Somehow, this novel circumstance had an effect on the development of his brain and gave him an absolute sense of direction so that he actually knew how he was positioned with respect to the stars wherever he might happen to be. An unwanted side effect of this was an irresistible urge that he felt to maintain this orientation intact. Thus, for example, if he descended a spiral staircase, when he eventually reached the bottom, he was obliged to spin around in the opposite direction until he recovered the relative position he had begun with at the top of the stairs.”

 Here, too, in order for the Kuuk Thaayore to be able to hold discussions that refer to position or direction, they have to know at all times which direction is North! As Boroditsky says: ‘The normal greeting in Kuuk Thaayorre is "Where are you going?" and the answer should be something like " Southsoutheast, in the middle distance." If you don't know which way you're facing, you can't even get past "Hello."’

 And this way of thinking affects their concept of time, also. You will be aware of the tests that we give to children asking them to arrange some picture cards in their correct order. These cards will show something happening and will only make sense in a particular order, like building a house say, beginning with a hole in the ground and a pile of bricks and ending with curtains at the window and smoke coming out the chimney. When the experimenters asked the Kuuk Thaayore to do this, instead of arranging them from left to right as we would do (or maybe right to left if you are Hebrew or top to bottom if Chinese), they arranged them from East to West, regardless of where they were sitting. And this is how they represent time.

 Another aspect mentioned by Boroditsky is that languages which utilize genders affect the way that people perceive objects. Thus, for example:

 In one study, we asked German and Spanish speakers to describe objects having opposite gender assignment in those two languages. The descriptions they gave differed in a way predicted by grammatical gender. For example, when asked to describe a "key" — a word that is masculine in German and feminine in Spanish — the German speakers were more likely to use words like "hard," "heavy," "jagged," "metal," "serrated," and "useful," whereas Spanish speakers were more likely to say "golden," "intricate," "little," "lovely," "shiny," and "tiny." To describe a "bridge," which is feminine in German and masculine in Spanish, the German speakers said "beautiful," "elegant," "fragile," "peaceful," "pretty," and "slender," and the Spanish speakers said "big," "dangerous," "long," "strong," "sturdy," and "towering." This was true even though all testing was done in English, a language without grammatical gender.

 She concludes her article (which you can read at http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/boroditsky09/boroditsky09_index.html): Language is central to our experience of being human, and the languages we speak profoundly shape the way we think, the way we see the world, the way we live our lives. We could make a leap here and add: Language also effectively creates the world of duality and prevents us from recognizing that everything is Brahman!

Okay, here is your starter for 10 – your time starts now! (If you're not familiar with this phrase, it relates to the quiz show 'University challenge', which was on British television for many years.)

 The question is: how many states of consciousness are there?

 I can almost see your mind tripping up and reading that question again. Surely, you will say, there are three states of consciousness – waking, dreaming and deep sleep. What can I possibly mean by querying this? Well, actually, depending upon how you answer this question, the number of states of consciousness could be two, three or five (or 4 ½) or you could argue that the very question is misconceived!

 It is true that most of the scriptures refer to 3 states. If you are reading the series of articles on the mANDUkya Upanishad, you will know that it refers to jAgrat, svapna and suShupti. These three states are mithyA and the reality underlying them is called turIya. In the tattva bodha (attributed to Shankara), the question is asked: avasthAtrayaM kim? – What are the three states? Admittedly, this is a bit presumptuous but the answer is given: jAgratsvapnasuShuptyavasthAH – they are the waking, dream and deep sleep states. And it goes on to explain each in turn.

 But most seekers will be well aware by now of the practice of adhyAropa-apavAda. Whenever we are told that X is the Advaitin’s answer to a particular question, it is quite likely that, when we look into the question more deeply, we will be given a different answer. There is one answer for the beginner and one for the advanced student. (And maybe several in between ones, too!)

 So where do the other possible answers come from?

 The answers ‘2’ or ‘invalid’ are given by one of the great champions of Shankara – Shri Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati (SSSS) in his book pa~nchapAdikA chintAmani, written in Kannada but translated (or freely rendered) into English by his pupil D. B. Gangolli in the very-difficult-to-obtain book (because only 1000 copies were printed in 1986) ‘The Magic Jewel of Intuition (The Tri-basic Method of Cognizing the Self)’. This is a fascinating book, although one which is difficult to read, since the book was not edited and Shri Gangolli’s command of the English language is not brilliant.

 In answering the question ‘How many states?’, he first points out that we should consider all the possibilities if the answer is to be final. Accordingly, he mentions wishful thinking, intoxication, insanity, fainting, delirium, sleep-walking, coma, semi-consciousness (just waking up but not yet quite made it – we all recognize this!), unconsciousness, hypnotic trance, samAdhi, mokSha and death. We could argue that these other states are not like waking, dream or deep sleep so ought to be examined.

 His first point is that we do see people in the above conditions but, since we see them from the waking state only, those conditions can be subsumed into that state. If something belongs to the world, then it belongs to the waking state, since the two go together. If there is a state in which there is no knowledge of the world then it is equivalent to the deep sleep state. In fact, we could argue that there are only two states – one in which we experience something external and one in which we do not. Then, waking and dream collapse into a single state and deep sleep is the second state. Wishful thinking and madness would then belong to the first state; deep sleep, unconsciousness, samAdhi and any other state in which there is no consciousness of anything external belong to the second state.

 Death, he says, is not really a state at all. Our waking state sees other people die but we have no data concerning our own death at this time, so cannot reasonably consider it at all. For seekers, the same applies to mokSha, by definition. And we cannot conceive of any experience other than ‘with external knowledge’ and ‘without external knowledge’.

 He then goes on to point out that we cannot describe any sort of ‘relationship’ between the states, because in order for there to be any sense of one being a cause, and another being an effect, they would have to exist within a common time frame. This they clearly do not, since a dream may encompass years of experience, yet we may return to the waking state to find that only minutes of waking time have elapsed. There is no common time frame in which the concept of causality could have meaning. Therefore, there is no question of any relationships between the states. Rather it is the case that the non-dual reality ‘appears’ as the states and each state is nothing but the entire reality. Accordingly, it is the world that appears in the state and not vice versa.

 Furthermore, the very idea that there are three states is one that is formed from the vantage point of the waking state. Since it has already been pointed out that the states cannot have any cause-effect relationship because they do not share common time or space, it makes no sense to speak of a ‘number’ of states at all. We cannot, from the waking state, justly speak of other states at all in relation to ourselves. And, as pointed out above, the supposed states of other people are all part of our waking world only.

 He also uses the rope-snake metaphor to conclude that the three states are not really there at all. The rope might be misperceived as a snake, a stream of water or a crack in the ground. When it is seen as one, it is not simultaneously seen as another and, when the reality of the rope is realized, none of the others are seen. Similarly, we are never simultaneously awake and asleep and, on enlightenment, we see everything as Brahman. Accordingly, the very notion of counting the number of states is something that only has relevance in the waking state.

 vyAsa, on the other hand, in the Brahma Sutra  effectively answers ‘5’ to this question (or at least 4 ½! – see below). The states are: waking, dreaming, deep sleep, coma and death. BS III.2.10 considers whether coma (referred to as ‘swoon’, mUrchA) is justified as being a separate state or not. The commentary below comes principally from the talks of Swami Paramarthananda, which are based on the bhAShya of Shankara. The argument is that coma cannot be considered to be the same as the waking state because, in it, we do not experience any external world. Similarly, it cannot be the same as the dreaming state because we do not experience any internal world. Finally, it cannot be the same as the deep sleep state for several reasons. Sleep is a natural process and its cause is both natural and healthy. We feel happy and refreshed when we come out of a deep sleep. None of these apply to a coma – when we go into a coma, we call for a doctor! In fact, we may well call for a doctor if we cannot go to sleep! I.e. we are worried by the presence of coma but the absence of sleep.

 Even the appearance of the person differs. In deep sleep, the features and body will be relaxed, whereas in a coma or faint, the whole body maybe in spasm with labored breathing etc and the eyes may be open. We can usually awaken the sleeping person quite easily, whereas it may well prove impossible to awaken someone from a coma. Finally, everyone goes to sleep on a regular basis (some more than others) whereas, for most people, unconsciousness is not at all a regular occurrence and is usually caused by some external event, such as a blow to the head.

 The question is also asked as to whether mUrchA could be included in the state of death (mAraNa). The answer to this is also ‘no’. Although we may be unconscious, activities of heart, lungs and brain still continue albeit perhaps at a reduced rate. In death, these all cease completely, never to be resumed in that body. And, it is quite normal for the jIva to resume life in the same body, even after a prolonged, comatose state. After mAraNam, however the jIva returns to life in a new body (if you believed my last blog on reincarnation). And, if the jIva returns to the same body, the state cannot have been the same as death, because of the very definition of the word.

 The actual sutra is मुग्धेऽर्द्धसम्पत्तिः परिशेषात् – mugdhe.arddhasampattiH parisheShAt, which is translated by Swami Sivananda: In a swoon (in him who is senseless) there is half union on account of this remaining (as the only alternative left, as the only possible hypothesis). So vyAsa concludes that this state is effectively half deep-sleep and half death, i.e. it is half-union with Brahman. It can be considered as the doorway to death. If there is remaining prArabdha karma, then the person will return to consciousness; if not he will die. Shankara concludes that it is a valid state, although it only happens occasionally but, since it is a mixture of the two states of deep sleep and death, it cannot be considered as a separate fifth state.